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administrative orders would serve the public interest as well as the threat
of criminal indictments and treble damages. Expert consideration of the
vexatious problems would offer more hope of an answer than dismissing
them simply as illegal restraints of trade.
THE NEW YORK ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
IN 1935 New York joined those jurisdictions which have sought to curb
by legislation the evils of the labor injunction.' The New York Statute,
Section 876(a) of the Civil Practice Act, was modeled after the federal
Norris-LaGuardia Act,2 but it seems to have produced a less notable improve-
ment in existing labor law. The federal Act, passed to remedy the harm
caused labor organization by courts which had taken a broad view of their
power to intervene by the injunctive device, has worked a considerable change
in judicial practice and attitude, and has triumphantly weathered an early
disposition on the part of the courts to cripple some of its provisions by
narrow construction.3 The New York Statute was launched in a state where
the highest court had taken a liberal attitude towards labor, but where un-
certainties in the law and illiberal ideas in many of the lower courts had
created critical problems. The Court of Appeals, which had a well-deserved
reputation as the outstanding liberal court of the country in labor questions,4
had pursued in general a hands-off policy towards normal union activities.
Striking, picketing, organization and other peaceful union operations were
permitted, not only in disputes between employer and employee, but also in
campaigns for unionization and for the enforcement of union rules and
standards.5 The court permitted the closed *shop, and the refusal of union
men to work on non-union made materials and with non-union men.0 On
1. N. Y. Civ. PRc. Acr § 876 (a), N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 477.
2. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 101 (1938).
3. See (1938) 2 Mo. L. REv. 1. The Supreme Court has checked the disposition of
certain cases in the Seventh Circuit to give the labor disputes definition an unduly narrow
construction. Lauf v. Shinner, 303 U. S. 323 (1938), rev'g 82 F. (2d) 63 (C. C. A. 7th,
1936). The Court recognized that the purpose of the Statute was to extend the Clayton
Act limitation on labor injunctions and to "obviate the results of the judicial construction
of that act." New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552, 562 (1937).
4. The New York court may recently have been succeeded by the Wisconsin court.
See (1936) 5 Imiv. JuRID. Ass'x Bu_. 59, (1939) 8 IN?. Junru. Ass'-: Bum. 29.
5. J. H. & S. Theatres v. Fay, 260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509 (1932); Stillwell
Theatres v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 605
(1932), 46 H~Av. L. RLv. 125; Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifldn, 245 N. Y. 260,
157 N. E. 130 (1927) ; National Protective Ass'n v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E.
369 (1902).
6. Bossart v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 52 (1917); National Protective
Ass'n v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369 (1902); Williams v. Quill, 227 X. Y.
1, 12 N. E. (2d) 547 (1938). See (1939) 8 INTr. Jutm. Ass'.; Bm. 38.
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the other hand, many of the lower courts, in which injunction proceedings
arise and in which, most of them are finally disposed of, adopted an unduly
restrictive position with respect to labor activities.
The Court of Appeals had difficulty in controlling this restrictive tendency,
either in appeal proceedings or by means of the doctrine of stare decisis.
The ruling cases attempted to mark off the boundaries of permissible union
activity by such vague criteria as "peaceful persuasion and publicity" con-
trasted with "violence or intimidation;"7 "inducement to breach of contract"
as opposed to "urging the recission or modification of a contract;"8 and in
the case of union objectives, "malice" or "intent to injure the employer" as
against "pursuit of benefit to labor." 9 These terms had no fixed content
from case to case; their unreality when applied by the lower courts to a
tense labor dispute situation was often clear. Nor did direct appeal prove
much more satisfactory than stare decisis as a mechanism of control. The
scope of review was necessarily limited by the discretionary character of
the injunctive remedy, while the conventional language used by the lower
courts in their firndings on complex labor issues often failed to provide the
appellate court with sufficient information on which to base an intelligent
decision. Since the element of time is often vital to the success of union
activities, the delays of appeal were a serious defect; where, as in the case
of many preliminary injunctions, the decree was based on inadequate evidence
or on ex parte affidavits which were "in part unfounded and in part grossly
exaggerated," 10 an eventual reversal was small comfort to a union which
had lost a strike in the meantime.
Against this background, the New York Statute seems to have been aimed
not so much at a modification of the Court of Appeals' doctrines, as at com-
pelling the lower courts to conform to those doctrines by making governing
principles more certain, by insuring adequate consideration of the cases and
by curbing the discretion of the trial courts. It was hoped that in this way
the number of injunctions granted would be sharply reduced, since they
would issue only where clearly necessary." The Statute seeks to reach these
objectives by employing two main devices. First, it deprives the New York
courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions except where a considerable list
7. J. H. & S. Theatres v. Fay, 260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509 (1932).
8. Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N. Y. 65, 159 N. E. 863 (1928).
9. Bossart v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917); National Protective
Ass'n v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369 (1902).
10. Frankenthaler, J., in Tree-Mark Shoe Co. v. Schwartz, 139 Misc. 136, 138, 248
N. Y. Supp. 56, 58 (Sup. Ct. 1931). The court here modified a preliminary injunction
granted at Special Term removing the ban on all picketing.
11. This expectation was largely realized. The number of injunctions granted in
labor disputes in New York decreased from about 100 per year to 10 per year in the
first year of the Statute. Note (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 1064, 1066, n. 13; (1936) 5 INT.
JURUO. Ass'N BULL. 5.
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of pre-requisite facts is pleaded and proved ;12 second, it provides that no
relief granted should prohibit striking, picketing, organization, combination
or other accepted union activities. 3
The list of required findings proved fairly successful in curbing the dis-
cretion of the trial courts. A degree of restraint in the use of labor injunc-
tions was enforced which, although justifiable under the doctrines of the
Court of Appeals, 14 was not general, or even usual, in lower court practice.
The Statute further bolsters its requirements of adequate evidence and find-
ings by providing, in the case of preliminary injunctions, for a hearing ex-
cluding affidavits, and by compelling the petitioner to post a bond for injuries
which may result to his opponent from an unjustified temporary injunc-
tion.' 5 The limitations on the relief which may be granted also reduce
judicial discretion, and for the first time specifically outlaw the sweeping
"blanket" injunction which may prohibit, in a given situation, almost all
union activity. 16
The general success of this statutory mechanism has been most marked in
the simple situation of a dispute between an employer and his employees.
Peaceful union activities are concededlh legitimate, and violence and intimi-
dation concededly enjoinable ;'7 in the already clear legal principles applicable
12. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr. §876(a)1 provides that no court shall have jurisdiction
to issue any injunction, permanent or temporary, except after a hearing and after finding
and filing in the record the following facts: that unlawful acts, or a breach of a contract
not contrary to public policy, will occur or will continue unless restrained; that there
will be substantial or irreparable injury to complainant unless the relief is granted; that
a greater injury will be worked on complainant by denying each item of the relief than
will be suffered by defendant if it is granted; that complainant has no adequate remedy
at law, and that the police cannot furnish complainant adequate protection.
13. N. Y. Civ. PRc. Acr § 876(a) 1(f).
14. The justification is to be found more from the spirit of these doctrines than
from their specific content. There was, at first, a tendency to regard the requirement
that the equities be balanced, supra note 12, and that the police protection is inadequate,
supra note 12, as making a change in the substantive law. This was done to deny these
provisions retroactive effect. Mficamold Radio Co. v. Beedie, 156 Mlisc 390, 282 N. Y.
Supp. 77 (Sup. Ct 1935), 35 COL. L. Rav. 1147; accord, National House Cleaning Con-
tractors, Inc. v. Babaluc, 251 App. Div. 401, 296 N. Y. Supp. 673 (1st Dep't 1937).
As soon as the problem of retroactive application disappeared, however, the courts ceased
to regard these provisions as changing the substantive law. Remington Rand, Inc. v.
Crofoot, 248 App. Div. 356, 289 N. Y. Supp. 1025 (4th Dep't 1936), aff'd ilhoul opir ion,
279 N. Y. 635, 18 N. E. (2d) 37 (1938); Aberdeen Restaurant Co. v. Gotfried, 158
'Misc. 785, 285 N. Y. Supp. 832 (Sup. Ct. 1935) ; DeAgostina v. Holmden, 157 Misc. 819,
285 N. Y. Supp. 909 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
15. N. Y. Civ. PPAc. AcT § 876 (a)3. Paragraph seven of the Statute provides that
all temporary injunctions shall expire within ten days. The maximum duration of per-
manent injunctions is six months, with the possibility of renewal for another six months
after hearing. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 876 (a) 8.
16. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr § 876 (a) 1(f).
17. This has been settled law in New York for a considerable period. In National
Protective Ass'n v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63-N. E. 369 (1902), the court felt able
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to this situation, the Act, therefore, makes little change. It does, however,
confront the applicant for injunctive relief with formidable obstacles at the
outset, and requires him to show clearly the justification for his petition.
The relief may go no further than the situation warrants, the ex parte pre-
liminary injunction is unavailable, and the possibility of intervention by an
anti-labor judge is greatly reduced.
In more complex fact situations, where the pre-existing law was less
certain and definite, the Statute has been considerably less successful. This
comparative failure appears to have resulted from the so-called "declaratory"
doctrine. The Court of Appeals in Goldfingur v. Feintuch,'8 the case in which
it first considered the Anti-Injunction Act, suggested that the Statute might
be only declaratory of existing law. "Declaratory," however, is a rather
vague word. It might mean simply that the requirements of the Statute
codified and applied the principles behind the later Court of Appeals cases.
But the lower courts, which from the start enthusiastically adopted the
declaratory approach,19 gave the term quite a different meaning. They inter-
preted the Statute as merely regulating the procedure of injunction actions,
without making any change in the substantive rights of the parties. 0 This
view has created serious problems. The constitution of New York is said
to prohibit legislative curtailment of the jurisdiction of the New York Supreme
Court,21 so that if the Statute is purely procedural, it cannot go far beyond
previous decisions in limiting the injunctive power. The procedural emphasis,
by retaining these decisions as governing authorities with respect to sub-
to include the general doctrine in a statement of principles of law assumed to be correct
without demonstration. Id. at 320, 63 N. E. at 372.
18. 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937).
19. May's Furs and Ready-to-Wear, Inc. v. Bauer, 255 App. Div. 643, 8 N. Y. S.
(2d) 819 (2d Dep't 1939); Remington Rand, Inc. v. Crofoot, 248 App. Div. 356, 289
N. Y. Supp. 1025 (4th Dep't 1936), aff'd without opinion, 279 N. Y. 635, 18 N. E. (2d)
37 (1938) ; Everett v. Penna, 168 Misc. 589, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 630 (Sup. Ct. 1938);
Greater City Master Plumber's Union v. Kahme, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 589 (Sup. Ct. 1937)
(the Act merely prevents the granting of injunctions lightly or informally).
20. The cases cited supra note 19 are in point here. See Note (1936) 46 YALE L. J.
1064; Legis. (1935) 22 VA. L. Rev. 83.
21. The constitutional provision referred to, which merely grants the Supreme Court
"general jurisdiction in law and equity" [N. Y. CoNsT. ART. 6, § 1] is interpreted as not
preventing legislative regulation of remedies within such reasonable limits as preserve
to plaintiff substantial equitable protection in the courts. Matter of Stillwell, 39 N. Y. 337,
34 N. E. 777 (1893) ; People ex rel. Swift v. Luce, 204 N. Y. 478, 97 N. E. 850 (1912) ;
People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601 (1921).
The Anti-Injunction Act is held to be within these limits. Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276
N. Y. 281, 289, 11 N. E. (2d) 910, 914 (1937). The constitutional requirement is, how-
ever, advanced to support the declaratory doctrine, and to limit the scope of possible
changes in the equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Busch Jewelry Co. v. United
Retail Employee's Local, 281 N. Y. 150, 155, 22 N. E. (2d) 320, 322 (1939) ; Aberdeen
Restaurant v. Gotfried, 158 Misc. 785, 285 N. Y. Supp. 832 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Stalban
v. Friedman, N. Y. L. J., April 3, 1939 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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stantive law, retains also the confusing standards they created in the more
complex labor situations such as those which arise in connection with "yellow
dog" or dosed shop contracts. This Comment is not concerned primarily
with the enforcement of such contracts between the immediate parties, or
with the difficult question of appropriate remedies;2 it is concerned with
the situation where a union seeks, by organization or other activity, to bring
about a result incompatible with the contract. The courts, in attempting to
reconcile the illegality of "inducing breach of contract" and the general per-
missibility of peaceful union activities in industry, have introduced a good
deal of confusion into the law. There was no clear decision in the Court of
Appeals as to a union's right to picket to induce breach of contract, but
it was held that a union might picket to inform the public that it regarded
the contract as contrary to the interests of labor, that it might urge recission
of the contract or that it might urge employees to resign and thus regain
their freedom to join it. Interborough Rapid Transit v. Lavin" is a par-
ticularly confusing decision along this line, since the court declined to decide
what would be the result if the employees secretly joined and did not resign.
Stillwell Theatres v. Kaplan;2 5 set forth what was probably the controlling
factor in the Court of Appeals' decisions, a reluctance to intervene in econ-
omic controversies. On the other hand, since there was no controlling rule
on picketing to induce breach of contract, some of the lower courts could,
and did, enjoin the picketing and other activities, often using also the alterna-
tive ground of irreparable injury to the employer.20 Where there was a
"yellow-dog contract," forcing employees to agree not to become or remain
members of a labor organization, or where the employer issued orders to
this effect and enforced them by dismissals, there seems to have been a
tendency to permit union pressure on one of the grounds suggested by the
Court of Appeals. On the other hand, where there was inter-union rivalry,
the situation was more doubtful, since the position of the employer, caught
between the lines and unable to satisfy both unions, aroused more judicial
sympathy. 7 This sympathy was particularly pronounced where the employer
22. See Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements is the Courts (1933) 48 Ymmu L J.
195; Schlesinger v. Quinto, 201 App. Div. 487, 194 N. Y. Supp. 401 (1st Dep't 1922);
Goldman v. Cohen, 222 App. Div. 631, 227 N. Y. Supp. 311 (1st Dep't 1923) (injunction
against violation by employer). See Grassi Construction Co. v. Bennett, 174 App. Div.
244, 160 N. Y. Supp. 269 (1st Dep't 1916) (violation by employee).
23. In Exchange Bakery & Restaurant Co. Y. Rifkln, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 . E. 130
(1927), decision was expressly reserved on this question.
24. 247 N. Y. 65, 159 N. E. 863 (1928).
25. 259 N. Y. 405, 412, 182 N. E. 63, 66 (1932), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 606 (1932).
26. W1olechak v. Wiseman, 145 Misc. 268, 259 N. Y. Supp. 225 (Sup. Ct. 1932);
Esco Operating Co. v. Kaplan, 144 Misc. 646, 258 N. Y. Supp. 303 (Sup. Ct. 1932);
Hertzog v. Cline, 131 Misc. 816, 227 N. Y. Supp. 462 (Sup. Ct. 1927); Altman v.
Schlesinger, 204 App. Div. 513, 193 N. Y. Supp. 128 (1st Dep't 1923).
27. See Stalban v. Friedman, N. Y. L. J., April 3, 1939 (Sup. Ct. 1939), 34 Ir±
L. Rzv. 536; Hertzog v. Cline, 131 Misc. 816, 227 N. Y. Supp. 462 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
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was liable to penalties for breach of contract with the union in possession
if he granted its rival's demands. In many cases, however, he had brought
the situation on himself, not only by failing to foresee it and take proper
precautions, but also by rushing to sign a contract with a complacent, if not
employer-dominated group, in order to stave off unionization by an active
and independent rival. Even in the presence of this rivalry, the Court of
Appeals declined to intervene. 28 Yet many of the lower courts were not so
hesitant.
Section 876(a) of the Civil Practice Act, in conjunction with the State
and Federal Labor Relations Acts, has cleared up part of the difficulty by
making yellow-dog contracts and orders by the employer to the same effect,
unenforceable and invalid.29 With respect to inter-union rivalry in the pres-
ence of contracts, the principles of the Statute seem to follow the doctrine
of the Stillwell case, since inducing breach of a "valid and subsisting con-
tract"30 is one of the grounds for which an injunction may be granted; but
the relief may not prohibit peaceful picketing and publicity.3 ' The confusing
criteria of the cases retained under the declaratory doctrine make it quite
probable, however, that lower courts will persist in enjoining union activity
where there is inter-union rivalry.
The continued reliance on past decisions has had an even more serious
effect in leading courts to adopt an unduly narrow construction of the statutory
definition of a "labor dispute," in order to avoid the necessity for following
the Statute where it overrules previous case law. The definition, which is
written in very broad language,32 is of crucial importance; on its interpreta-
tion depends the scope of application of the entire Act. The dependence of
the Statute upon this section is particularly clear where a union seeks to
effectuate its pressure upon an employer by following his products into the
hands of contractors, middlemen or customers. The union may either refuse
to allow its members to handle such products, or picket establishments where
they are sold or used. In either case the contractor or retailer is likely to
28. Stillwell v. Kaplan, cited supra note 25.
29. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 876(a)l(f) 2 and 10, prevents any relief from forbidding
a person to become or remain a member of any labor organization or to urge others
to do so. In addition a yellow-dog contract or an order by an employer forbidding his
employees to join a union would, of course, be a violation of the right of free self
organization granted by the New York Labor Relations Act. N. Y. LABOR LAW § 703.
Cf. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr § 7, 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 157 (1938).
30. N. Y. Civ. PRac. Acr §876(a)I(a).
31. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 876 (a) 1 (f) 5.
32. The definition of a labor dispute in the Statute is almost unbelievably complex.
N. Y. Civ. PRapc Acr. § 876(a) 10. The labor disputes definition is recognized as the
"danger point" in the anti-injunction statutes. Electric Coal Co. v. Rice, 80 F. (2d)
1 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), 21 CORN. L. Q. 640. The New York Legislature probably had
this fact in view when it made such an elaborate effort to frame an "interpretation
proof" definition. Note (1937) 50 HARv. L. Rzv. 1295; Comment (1937) 15 N. Y. U.
L. Q. REv. 116; Note (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 1553.
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apply for an injunction, often alleging an illegal "secondary boycott." Some
courts have adopted a very restrictive attitude towards union activities under
these circumstances,33 but New York has followed a more liberal rule.3'
There union men ordinarily need not handle such products. The test for
the legitimacy of picketing was declared in Goldfingcr v. Feintuch to be "unity
of interest" between the manufacturer and the tlird party, while in Auburn
Draying Company v. Wardwdll,-3 5 the test was whether the union merely
urged the public not to buy particular products, or whether it attempted to
compel the third party to take sides by urging the public not to buy from
him at all. The latter was held to be an illegal secondary boycott. This test
is also implicitly included in the Goldfingcr case by the court's repeated em-
phasis on the fact that the pickets merely urged the public not to buy a
particular product. Finding that the plaintiff was in "unity of interest" with
the employer party to the dispute, the court in the Goldfingcr case found a
labor dispute within the meaning of Section 876(a), since the parties were
"all in the same industry."
The tests of "unity of interest" and "compulsion of third parties," which
might well be considered separate, seem in practice to run together. The
courts hold that where there is a secondary boycott, in the sense of a general
boycott of a third party, there is neither unity of interest nor a labor dispute
under the Statute.36 This seems to result from a desire to insulate the third
party from injury in the greatest degree compatible with effective union
pressure upon the primary party to the dispute, the manufacturer. The
concept of "unity of interest" is regarded as a means by which permissible
union activity may be limited to dealings in the manufacturer's particular
product. Where union pressure extends to the entire business of the middle-
man, unity of interest is found to be lacking, and the third party and the
33. See cases collected in (1919) 6 A. L. R. 909, 934, 957.
34. Bossart v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1918); Feinburg, The Arczu
York Law of Secondary Boycotts (1936) 6 BnOonLvi, L Rx. 209.
35. 227 N. Y. 1, 124 N. E. 97 (1919), 6 A. L. R. 901.
36. ,Veil & Co. v. "John Doe", 168 Misc. 211, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 559 (Sup. Ct.
1938) ; American Gas Stations v. "John Doe," 250 App. Div. 227, 293 N. Y. Supp. 1019
(2d Dep't 1937). These cases, involving the picketing of premises displaying non-
union made signs, pose a problem as to how, under the "particular product" emphasis,
the union can picket the sign as distinct from the business which it advertises. The great
majority of the cases regard this metaphysical feat as impossible and enjoin the picketing.
See also People v. Bellows, 281 N. Y. 67, 22 N. E. (2d) 238 (1939). This was a
criminal prosecution of persons who peacefully picketed the purchaser of such a sign.
They were convicted by a magistrate who ruled that "Secondary boycotting, even though
peaceful, constitutes disorderly conduct." The Court of Special Sessions, Appellate
Part, reversed, holding that the ruling confused civil and criminal remedies. People v.
Bellows, 170 Mfisc. 66, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 850 (Sp. Sess. 1939). The Court of Appeals ap-
proved the magistrate's finding and sent the case back for a new trial, holding that
secondary boycotts were illegal, there being no "unity of interest."
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union are not in the same industry for the purposes of the Statute. The
same result is reached where the third party is a mere customer of the manu-
facturer, as in the cases involving purchasers of non-union-made neon signs.
At the same time, this rather narrow construction of the labor disputes
definition greatly lessens the effectiveness of the Anti-Injunction Act in these
boycott cases by limiting the application of the statutory requirements to
circumstances where, under pre-existing doctrines, the injunction should not
issue anyway.
In some cases a somewhat narrow conception of what constitutes a labor
dispute does no particular harm. An example of this is found in Thompson
v. Boekhout, where it was held that there is no labor dispute if plaintiff has
no present employees. 37 This exception is not serious, particularly as modified
in Boro Park Sanitary Live Poultry Market v. Heller, which excluded from
the exception a family corporation where the stockholders worked.A8 Besides,
it has been held that even if there is no labor dispute as presented in the
Thompson case, there still may be picketing."
On the other hand, the use of a very narrow construction has caused some
of the lower courts to decline to apply the Statute in circumstances which it
seems clearly intended to cover. The Appellate Division for example, in
May's Furs and Ready to Wear Company v. Bauer,40 evolved an implied
exception to the Act under which, if a union engages in extreme, violent and
unlawful conduct, the controversy is no longer a labor dispute and the
requirements of the Act may be dispensed with. Another court held that
activities growing out of a demand for concessions contrary to an existing
contract could not be called a labor dispute if the enforceability of contracts
was to be preserved. 41 So also it was held to be no labor dispute where an
employer avoided the possibility of one by closing down his plant ;42 where
he signed a contract on the basis of false representations ;43 where the union
had been denied permission to do business in the state ;44 or where all of
plaintiff's employees were members of a union which was a rival of the
37. 273 N. Y. 390, 7 N. E. (2d) 674 (1937).
38. 280 N. Y. 481, 21 N. E. (2d) 687 (1939).
39. Bieber v. Bennbaum, 168 Misc. 943, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 63 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
40. 255 App. Div. 643, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 819 (2d Dep't 1939.)
41. Associated Flour Handlers & Warehousemen v. Sullivan, 168 Misc. 315, 5
N. Y. S. (2d) 982 (Sup. Ct. 1938). See Jenson v. St. Paul Moving Picture Machine
Operator's Local, 194 Minn. 58, 259 N. W. 811 (1935). In the Jenson case, a union
picketed to induce compliance with plaintiff's contract to employ its members. The court
sustained an injunction, finding that there was no labor dispute under the state anti-
injunction act, because defendants had an "adequate remedy at law for damages," and
hence the dispute related to damages rather than to terms and conditions of employment.
Contra: Bulkin v. Sacks, 31 D. & C. 501 (Pa. C. P. 1938).
42. Paul v. Mencher, 169 Misc. 657, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 821 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
43. Burd & Margalies v. Marcus, 100 N. Y. L. J. 1947 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
44. Hoffman's Vegetarian Restaurant v. Lee, 101 N. Y. L. J. 253 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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picketing organization.45 It would appear that in all these cases, except
possibly the last one,40 even if a labor dispute had been found to exist, an
injunction could still issue against violence, breach of contract or fraudulent
conduct. The courts in these cases attempted to avoid the Act in order to
allow plaintiff to obtain his injunction without making the proof essential
to the required findings, and to justify injunctions more sweeping than its
terms permit.
Perhaps the most serious result of the same reliance on past decisions,
which produced the narrow definition of labor disputes, is found in a recent
case which crippled the provision forbidding injunctions against peaceful
picketing. The Court of Appeals in Naun v. Rahnist 7 had sustained an injunc-
tion forbidding picketing where there had been violent and illegal conduct. A
similar situation arose in Busch Jcclrhy Company v. United Retail Einployce's
LocaL4 8 There Justice Cotillo, on the authority of Nan, v. Rainist, enjoined
all picketing. He disposed of Section 876(a) by saying it was purely pro-
cedural and declaratory, and could not forbid the injunction in the light of
the constitutional provision granting jurisdiction. The decision was affirmed
by the Appellate Division and again by the Court of Appeals.4 0 The latter
court used language curiously reminiscent of the May's case, saying that if
unions, deliberately and with full knowledge, advise and encourage the com-
mission of illegal acts, they are no longer entitled to the benefits of special
statutes enacted to protect them in the enjoyment of their conceded rights. 9
This language is probably dictum, since the basis of the court's decision
45. Stalban v. Friedman, N. Y. L. J., April 3, 1939 (Sup. Ct. 1939), 34 Im. L.
RE:v. 356. Here the granting of the injunction seems contrary not only to the require-
ments of the Statute, but also to pre-existing law. Stillwel Theatres v. Kaplan, 259
N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932) cert. denicd, 293 U. S. 605 (1932).
46. See supra note 45.
47. 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690 (1931).
48. 168 Misc. 224, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 575 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd, 255 App. Div. 970,
8 N. Y. S. (2d) 819 (2d Dep't 1939). This drastic injunction not only seems unjustified
under the Statute, but also failed to have a beneficial effect in the instant case. The
dispute involved dragged on for a year or so with increasing bitterness. It gave rise to
a multiplicity of suits of various kinds, and over thirty conferences aimed at settling it
were unsuccessful. In January, 1939, the injunction came before Justice Cotillo again,
on application for the six% month renewal provided for in §867(a)3. He decided that
a decree either way would solve nothing, and after e.vamining European methods of
settling labor disputes, secured a truce in the activities on both sides pending the report
of a committee, appointed by the court to take testimony, and, it was hoped, settle the
strike. After ishing aloud for compulsory arbitration or a special system of labor
courts, Justice Cotillo appointed a distinguished committee consisting of Dean Smith
of the Columbia Law School, Sidney Hillman and Percy Magnus of the New York Board
of Trade. The proceeding is reported in 169 Misc. 854, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 167 (Sup. Ct.
1939).
49. 281 N. Y. 150, 22 N. E. (2d) 320 (1939).
50. 281 N. Y. 155, 22 N. E. (2d) 322 (1939).
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seems to be its belief that, in view of the background of the controversy, any
picketing "would involve fraud, violence, or breach of the peace." Even on
the facts, however, the decision seems unwarranted. Judge Lehman, who
dissented on the basis of the words of the Statute, pointed out that the finding
below was not that all picketing would involve breach of the peace, but only
that it would "indicate the danger" thereof.5 1 Nevertheless, so high is the
authority of this court, that the "aid and comfort" which its words give to
the doctrine of the May's case constitutes the most serious threat to date
that, as a result of the declaratory doctrine and the attendant view that the
Statute makes only procedural changes in the existing injunction law, the
Anti-Injunction Act may be seriously crippled.
A possible solution to the threatened impairment of the New York Act
is suggested by the treatment which the Wisconsin Anti-Injunction Act has
enjoyed at the hands of the Wisconsin courts. The Wisconsin Statuteo2 is
similar to that of New York, but the Wisconsin courts, not having such
a large body of judicially-evolved injunction law before them,5 3 found it
easier to interpret the Statute as not only altering procedure, but also granting
new substantive rights to labor. An example of this view is found in the
leading Wisconsin case upon the interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Statute,
American Furniture Company v. International Brotherhood. 4 In this case
the union sought by picketing to compel the unionization of a shop in which
the union had no present members, and in which the workers apparently
did not desire to join the union, even though the employer did not object
to their doing so. The court refused to enjoin the picketing, holding that
the controversy was within the statutory definition of a labor dispute. The
legislature was held to have declared in the Statute the lawfulness of acts
which in its judgment were necessary in order to give labor an economic
weapon which would balance the power of the employer.
An important consideration which caused the New York courts to hesitate
in giving this construction to their Statute was the fear that such substantive
changes in the rights of private parties in labor disputes would be a viola-
tion of the due process clause in the state and federal constitutions.5 Truax
v. Corrigan," which struck down an Arizona statute, modeled after the
Clayton Act labor provisions, was cited as authority for this view. The
51. 281 N. Y. 157, 159, 22 N. E. (2d) 322, 324 (1939).
52. Wis. STAT. (1937) § 103.56-63, Wis. Laws (1931) c. 376.
53. The Wisconsin Court in David Ables & Sons Co. v. Moglio, 200 Wis. 153,
228 N. W. 123 (1929), commented on this lack of injunction cases, ascribing it to the
mutual respect for each other's rights exhibited by capital and labor in the state.
54. American Furniture Co. v. International Brotherhood, 222 Wis. 338, 268 N. W.
250 (1936).
55. Aberdeen Restaurant v. Gotfried, 158 Misc. 785, 285 N. Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct.
1935).
56. 257 U. S. 312 (1921).
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Supreme Court of the United States surmounted this difficulty in Scnn v.
The Tile Layer's Protective Union, where the Wisconsin Act, as interpreted
by the Wisconsin court, was sustained.5 7 Mr. Justice Brandeis relied in his
opinion on the fact that the substantive changes alleged to have been made
did not go much further than previous doctrines already warranted. The
Court distinguished Truax v. Corrigan on the ground that the statute there
involved purported to legalize violent and unlawful conduct.
Since, then, the Supreme Court permits substantive changes so long as
they do not greatly modify existing essential rights, the New York Court
of Appeals, which has never specifically indorsed the declaratory doctrine,
is now in a position where it can adopt the Wisconsin view. This would
not involve granting substantive rights much beyond those already conceded;
but it would remedy the problems of interpretation, and of compliance with
the New York Constitution, which under the declaratory doctrine have
created so much trouble. The objection created by the limitation which the
New York Constitution, as interpreted, places on procedural changes would
disappear; since clearly the legislature, if it may legalize a course of conduct,
may also deprive the courts of "jurisdiction" to punish for it.m Under the
Wisconsin view, there would be no inducement to, and no authority for, an
unduly narrow construction of the labor dispute section of the New York
Statute; and the confusion resulting from the mingling of the vague criteria
of pre-existing law with the statutory terms could be avoided by interpreting
the Statute, as Wisconsin does, as in substance a labor code, in itself suffi-
cient in all normal situations to guide and govern the course of judicial
action in the vexed field of the labor injunction.
57. 301 U. S. 468 (1937), aff'g. 222 Wis. 383, 268 N.. 270 (1936).
58. This point was made in answer to the constitutional objection in American
Furniture Co. v. International Brotherhood, 222 Wis. 338, 365, 268 N. \V. 250, 263 (1936).
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